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1. Introduction  
Early nuclear energy system designs grew out of programs to develop nuclear weapons, 
and accordingly these systems were optimized to produce weapons usable material. As the 
nuclear industry matured and the use of nuclear power spread, safety, cost, environmental 
impact and waste management considerations shaped nuclear energy system designs that 
were deployed for the purpose of producing electricity. A multi-faceted international 
nonproliferation regime comprised of treaty commitments and obligations, verification 
mechanisms, export controls, and diplomatic strategies intended to dissuade States from 
proliferating has grown (Figure 1). Likewise, measures to prevent theft of nuclear materials 
by subnational groups have been implemented at both the national and international levels. 
There has been continuing interest in developing nuclear technologies that would permit the 
peaceful use of nuclear power without an associated proliferation of nuclear weapons 
capability. The term “proliferation resistant” was coined to describe technologies that are 
not suitable for the production of weapons usable material.  
Despite this interest in “proliferation resistant technologies,” the reality remains that a truly 
proliferation-proof nuclear energy system has yet to be discovered. A fuller understanding 
of the nature of nuclear proliferation would suggest that motivation, underlying political-
military ambitions, in some cases domestic political imperatives, are key drivers for 
proliferation or for decisions not to pursue nuclear weapons development. There is no 
technological “silver bullet” that will solve the proliferation challenge. Even for technologies 
that are said to be more difficult to misuse for proliferation purposes, one must recognize 
that the international transfer of such technology can impart to the recipient technical 
capabilities and know-how that can be put to use in facilities that could be used to support a 
nuclear weapons program.  
A more productive course of action would be to consider how a particular technology or 
facility design might lend itself to more effective and efficient forms of international 
verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Beginning early in the 1950s, 
international safeguards agreements and principles were put in place to make certain that as 
the use of nuclear power spread it would be used for peaceful purposes only, and if a State 
were to misuse these technologies it would be detectable so that the international 
community could take timely action. The more difficult and detectable it was to use a 
system to make nuclear weapons usable material, the better.  
As discussed below, the notion of “proliferation resistance” in this context is more relative, 
that is, how one system might compare to another. Results of proliferation resistance studies 
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should not be construed as implying that a particular system is proliferation-proof, nor that 
features claimed to make a system more proliferation resistant provide a rationale for 
relaxing: 1) international safeguards for such systems; 2) controls on the export of such 
systems and related technologies; or 3) the nonproliferation credentials and commitments of 
the recipient of such technology transfers.  
 
 
Fig. 1. International safeguards agreements  
Nuclear energy system designers and engineers must understand not only how to design 
and build their systems to make them safe and secure, but also easy to safeguard. In this 
chapter, we will show how proliferation resistance has been studied, what can be learned 
from these studies, and how the results can used in the international community. As already 
stated, the problem of nuclear proliferation is multi-faceted, with a long and complicated 
history, and for purposes of this chapter we will focus only on the concept of proliferation 
resistance.  
2. Proliferation resistance 
The generally accepted definition for proliferation resistance is: 
“… that characteristic of a nuclear energy system that impedes the diversion or undeclared 
production of nuclear material or misuse of technology by States in order to acquire nuclear weapons 
or other nuclear explosive devices. The degree of proliferation resistance results from a combination of, 
inter alia; technical design features, operational modalities, institutional arrangements and 
safeguards measures. Intrinsic proliferation resistance features are those features that result from the 
technical design of nuclear energy systems, including those that facilitate the implementation of 
extrinsic measures. Extrinsic proliferation resistance measures are those measures that result from 
States’ decisions and undertakings related to nuclear energy systems.” (IAEA-STR-332, 2002)  
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This definition makes clear that proliferation resistance should be considered a function of 
the intrinsic technical features (facility design and operation) and extrinsic properties 
(implementation of international agreements and safeguards) of a nuclear energy system. 
The degree of effectiveness of these properties is used to determine a nuclear energy 
system’s proliferation resistance.  
Studies of nuclear proliferation can be broadly separated into two distinct categories, as 
follows:   
 State-level proliferation studies (e.g., Meyer 1984; Singh & Way 2004; Li et al. 2009, etc.) 
examine the implications and consequences of State motivations, resources (technical, 
human, and financial), geostrategic or regional rivalries, and international agreements. 
Using this information, analysts assess the likelihood that a State will proliferate or 
attempt to do so.  
 Technical proliferation studies address elements of Nuclear Energy Systems (NES), 
focusing on their possible contributions to a nuclear weapons program. Technical 
studies can range from evaluating an individual facility or unit to examining all 
elements of a fuel cycle.  
This chapter focuses on technical proliferation resistance studies, which can be used to:  
 evaluate characteristics of proposed nuclear energy systems that are intended to 
impede the diversion or undeclared production of nuclear material or the misuse of 
technology,  
 evaluate the vulnerability of proposed NES design and operational features from a 
proliferation resistance point of view, 
 evaluate the applicability and effectiveness of international safeguards measures, 
 provide a basis for improving both facility intrinsic features (design options) and 
extrinsic measures (safeguards) to achieve an appropriate balance, and 
 communicate proliferation resistance strengths and weaknesses of the NES to decision 
makers in a transparent, understandable and meaningful way. (Zentner, et al., 2009) 
3. Proliferation risk 
Although the terms “proliferation resistance” and “proliferation risk” are sometimes used 
interchangeably, they are not synonymous. Technically, risk can be defined (Kaplan & 
Garrick, 1981) in terms of a risk “triplet”:  1) What can go wrong? 2) How likely is it? 3) What 
are the consequences?  For proliferation risk, technical proliferation resistance studies answer 
the first and the third questions, but answering the second—the likelihood of the deliberate 
act of proliferation—is a difficult calculation most suited to State level proliferation studies 
as described above.  
Accordingly, proliferation resistance should be considered a component of proliferation 
risk, and proliferation resistance studies may be useful to identify means of addressing 
elements of that risk. The concept of proliferation risk includes much broader political 
considerations than proliferation resistance, and will not be further addressed here. 
4. Physical protection 
It is important to understand the difference between the concepts of Proliferation Resistance 
and Physical Protection. Physical protection is defined as “that characteristic of an NES that 
impedes the theft of materials suitable for nuclear explosives or radiation dispersal devices 
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(RDDs) and the sabotage of facilities and transportation by sub-national entities and other 
non-Host State adversaries. 
The objective of a physical protection system is to minimize the susceptibility to and 
opportunity for unauthorized removal of nuclear material in use, storage or transport and of 
sabotage of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. The effectiveness of the system is 
demonstrated by its capability to prevent the successful execution of a malicious act and to 
prevent and/or mitigate radiological consequences thereof.  
Physical protection concerns are not unique to the nuclear industry. Although what is to be 
protected; consequences of a successful attack; and approaches for detecting, delaying, and 
responding to an attack may differ, the same basic principles are applied to protect any 
important facility against sabotage or theft, whether it is an NES, an oil refinery, a 
communications center, or a military site (Bari, 2009). Accordingly Physical Protection will 
not be further addressed in this chapter. 
5. Studying proliferation resistance  
A number of distinct procedures for the study of proliferation resistance exist. Four 
representative methodologies (TOPS1, INPRO2, SAPRA3, and GEN IV PR&PP WG4) are 
described below. All use the standard definition of proliferation resistance, “… that 
characteristic of a nuclear energy system that impedes the diversion or undeclared production of 
nuclear material or misuse of technology by States in order to acquire nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive device…”, but take distinctly different approaches.  
They can be broadly separated into two classes:  multi-attribute utility analyses (MAUA) 
and pathway analyses. In the first class (TOPS, INPRO, and SAPRA) a set of attributes (i.e., 
material and technical barriers to proliferation) are identified and relevant values are 
established for measuring the relevant importance or effectiveness of each barrier against a 
particular proliferation threat. In the second class (GEN IV PR&PP WG) possible 
proliferation pathways are postulated involving the diversion of weapons usable material or 
misuse of technology to produce such material. For each pathway, acquisition scenarios are 
identified and analyzed, and the resulting outcomes are compared using specified sets of 
proliferation resistance measures.  
5.1 Technological Opportunities to Increase the Proliferation Resistance of Global 
Civilian Nuclear Power Systems (TOPS) 
The TOPS Task Force 5 was established in 1999 to “identify near and long-term technical 
opportunities to increase the proliferation resistance of global civilian nuclear power 
systems and to recommend specific areas of research that should be pursued to further these 
goals” (TOPS, 2001). After reviewing several proposed approaches, a MAUA methodology 
was developed that identifies a set of material and technical attributes considered barriers to 
proliferation, with relevant importance values. Material barriers are properties that affect the 
                                                                 
1 TOPS: Technological Opportunities to Increase the Proliferation Resistance of Global Civilian Nuclear Power 
Systems 
2 INPRO: International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (IAEA) 
3  SAPRA: Simplified Approach for Proliferation Resistance Assessment of Nuclear Systems 
4 GEN IV PR&PP WG:  Generation IV Proliferation  Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group 
5 Created by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology 
and DOE’s Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee (NERAC)  
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desirability or attractiveness of the material as an explosive. Technical barriers are those 
aspects that make it difficult to gain access to materials and/or to use or misuse facilities to 
obtain weapons-usable materials (Table 1). 
 
 
Table 1. Comparison of TOPS and SAPRA barriers (Greneche et al., 2007) 
Diversion Transport Transform
Weapon 
fabricate
Critical Mass 1
Isotopic Enrichment 2
Spontaneous Neutron 
Generation
Heat Generation Rate
Radiation
3
M
a
te
ri
a
l
Facility unattractiveness
SAPRA
TOPS Note
Isotopic
Dangerousness (other than 
irradiation)
Chemical
Barrier  Descriptions
Time 
Technical difficulty
Radiological (other than the 
material)
Mass and bulk
Physical form
Detectability
Collusion level
Construction detectability
Signature of installation
T
e
ch
n
ic
a
l
Safeguards
Access/control/security
Facility accessibility
Available mass
Diversion detectability
Skill, expertise, knowledge
3 - In SAPRA, this barrier is implicitly included in other technical barriers linked to the 
diversion phase, in particular the "technical difficulty" and accessibility" barriers
Notes:
Barriers Considered in each method
Location/distance (for transport 
phase)
E
x
tr
in
si
c
1 - in SAPRA, this barrier is implicitly included in "Mass and Bulk" barrier
2- Isotopic barrier plays a role only when enrichment is inescapable to obtained direct 
weapons usable material
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Examples of material barriers used in the original TOPS procedure included material 
isotopic, radiological, and chemical properties, in addition to mass or bulk. Technical 
barriers included attractiveness of the facility to a potential weapons program, difficulty of 
facility access, detectability of proliferator actions, and necessary skills and time needed for 
the proliferator’s actions.  
As the use of the TOPS methodology has matured, a variety of approaches has been 
developed to determine barrier values. For example, in one proliferation resistance study 
using the TOPS approach (Skutnik et al., 2009), barrier values were developed using a 
“fuzzy logic” based attributed analysis approach. This technique was intended to overcome 
the challenges of subjectivity inherent in development of the barrier values. The resulting 
model was tested by evaluating several reprocessing technologies, and the results were 
found to generally agree with more structured PR studies.  
The TOPS approach forms the basis for a number of advanced assessment methodologies, 
two of which (INPRO and SAPRA) are described in more detail below.  
5.2 Simplified Approach for Proliferation Resistance Assessment of Nuclear Systems 
(SAPRA) 
In 2002, a French nuclear industry working group was formed to select and develop a 
methodology for assessing the proliferation resistance of nuclear energy systems. The result 
was a methodology called the Simplified Approach for Proliferation Resistance Assessment of 
Nuclear Systems (SAPRA). SAPRA (Greneche et al., 2007) is an evolutionary approach based 
on the TOPS methodology, with a number of modifications, additions, and improvements. 
Table 1 compares the two approaches. 
SAPRA separates proliferation into four phases:  diversion, transport, transformation, and 
nuclear weapon fabrication. At each phase, intrinsic and extrinsic barriers to proliferation 
are identified and scored based on the perceived robustness of the barrier. SAPRA 
addressed the complete fuel cycle. A panel of experts was assembled to determine the 
values to be assigned to each of the barriers. The values were then added together to give an 
aggregate “Proliferation Resistance Index.” Using these results the strengths and 
weaknesses of the various nuclear energy systems studied were identified. SAPRA is unique 
among most proliferation resistance assessment approaches in that it explicitly includes 
theft by a State as a possible proliferation threat.  
5.3 Guidance for the Application of an Assessment Methodology for Innovative 
Nuclear Energy Systems – Proliferation Resistance (INPRO)  
Beginning in 2002, the IAEA’s International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel 
Cycles (INPRO) developed a proliferation resistance assessment methodology that is 
primarily based on a multi-attribute utility analysis approach. The INPRO proliferation 
resistance approach identifies one Basic Principle of Proliferation Resistance with five User 
Requirements for meeting this Principle, along with seventeen indicators with specific criteria 
and acceptance limits (IAEA, 2007). 
The Proliferation Resistance Basic Principle is: “Proliferation resistance intrinsic features and 
extrinsic measures shall be implemented throughout the full life cycle for an INS to help ensure that 
INSs will continue to be an unattractive means to acquire fissile material for a nuclear weapons 
program. Both intrinsic features and extrinsic measures are essential, and neither shall be considered 
sufficient by itself.”  
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The five Proliferation Resistance User Requirements are:   
1. States' commitments, obligations and policies regarding nonproliferation and its 
implementation should be adequate to fulfil international non-proliferation standards.  
2. The attractiveness of nuclear material and nuclear technology in an INS for a nuclear 
weapons program should be low.  
3. Any diversion of nuclear material should be reasonably difficult and detectable. 
4. Innovative nuclear energy systems should incorporate multiple proliferation resistance 
features and measures.  
5. The combination of intrinsic features and extrinsic measures, compatible with other 
design considerations, should be optimized in the design/engineering phase to provide 
cost-efficient proliferation resistance.  
Table 2 (IAEA, 2007) shows User Requirement 3 including the description of the User 
Requirement, related criteria, indicators, and acceptance limits. 
Several studies have been performed to demonstrate the use of the INPRO methodology. An 
important example is the “INPRO Collaborative Project PRADA: Proliferation Resistance: 
Acquisition/Diversion Pathway Analysis” (Chang & Ko, 2010). In this study of the proposed 
South Korean DUPIC6 fuel cycle User Requirements 3 and 4 were evaluated using a 
modification of the PR&PP pathway analysis methodology (section 5.4). The PRADA study 
concludes that a multiplicity of barriers is not sufficient to ensure robust proliferation 
resistance; rather robustness is not a result of the number of barriers or of their individual 
characteristics but is an integrated function of the whole system. 
5.4 Generation IV International Forum Proliferation Resistance and Physical 
Protection Evaluation Methodology (GEN IV PR&PP WG) 
The Generation IV International Forum7 (GIF) formed a working group in December 2002 to 
develop a method for studying proliferation resistance and physical protection of advanced 
NES to support the proliferation related technology goal of Generation IV (GIF002-00, 2002; 
PR&PP, 2006) Nuclear Energy Systems (NES):   “Generation IV NESs will increase the assurance 
that they are a very unattractive and the least desirable route for diversion or theft of weapons-usable 
materials, and provide increased physical protection against acts of terrorism.” 
After exploring several options, the working group developed a methodology using a 
pathway analysis approach. The methodology separates pathways into three stages:  
acquisition, processing, and weaponization. Weaponization is normally not further evaluated 
in these GIF studies. For a proposed NES design, proliferation challenges (or threats) are 
identified, the NES response to these challenges is analyzed, and outcomes are assessed as a 
set of proliferation resistance measures for each pathway (Figure 2). 
The measures determine: 1) the difficulty of the approach; 2) how long it will take to 
accomplish the goal; 3) how much it will cost to achieve; 4) how much the safeguards 
system for the NES will cost; 5) how likely it is that actions in the pathway will be detected; 
and 6) the material of concern  
While developing the methodology, members of the working group performed a number of 
studies to demonstrate and improve the approach. A PR evaluation of a proposed nuclear 
energy system consisting of four liquid metal reactors and co-located reprocessing and fuel 
                                                                 
6 DUPIC (Direct Use of PWR spent fuel In CANDU reactors) 7 The Generation IV International Forum is “a cooperative international endeavor organized to carry out the 
research and development (R&D) needed to establish the feasibility and performance capabilities of the next 
generation nuclear energy systems. “ (GIF, 2000) 
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production facilities (PR&PP, 2009), showed that a study performed early in the conceptual 
design phase of an NES can provide information useful for ensuring an optimal safeguards 
system concept and provide a basis for detailed systems design. A PR evaluation (Whitlock, 
2010) of an advanced CANDU reactor design (ACR-1000) provided useful information to the 
facility design team and resulted in changes that improved facility safeguards without 
impacting other design requirements. In another study (Zentner, et al. 2010) a suite of four 
reactors was evaluated against a common set of proliferation threats, and areas where 
safeguards approaches and technology can be improved through the use of safeguards-by-
design studies were identified. 
 
Basic Principle BP: Proliferation resistance intrinsic features and extrinsic measures shall 
be implemented throughout the full life cycle for innovative nuclear energy systems to help 
ensure that INSs will continue to be an unattractive means to acquire fissile material for a 
nuclear weapons program. Both intrinsic features and extrinsic measures are essential, and 
neither shall be considered sufficient by itself. 
User Requirements (UR) Criteria (CR) 
Indicator(IN) Acceptance Limits (AL) 
UR3 Difficulty and 
detectability of diversion:  
The diversion of nuclear 
material (NM) should be 
reasonably difficult and 
detectable. Diversion 
includes the use of an INS 
facility for the production or 
processing of undeclared 
material. 
CR3.1 quality of measurement
IN3.1: Accountability. AL3.1: Based on expert judgment 
equal or better than existing 
designs, meeting international 
state of practice. 
CR3.2 C/S measures and monitoring
IN3.2: Amenability for 
C/S measures and 
monitoring. 
AL3.2: Based on expert judgment 
equal or better than existing 
designs, meeting international 
best practice.
CR3.3 detectability of NM
IN3.3: Detectability of 
NM. 
AL3.3: Based on expert judgment 
equal or better than existing 
facilities. 
CR3.4 facility process
IN3.4: Difficulty to modify 
process. 
AL3.4: Based on expert judgment 
equal or better than existing 
designs, meeting international 
best practice. 
CR3.5 facility design
IN3.5: Difficulty to modify 
facility design. 
AL3.5 = AL3.4 
CR3.6 facility misuse 
IN3.6: detectability to 
misuse technology or 
facilities.
AL3.6 = AL3.4 
Table 2. INPRO User Requirement 3, Difficulty and detectability of diversion 
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The results of these studies establish that the methodology can usefully frame the evaluation 
of the proliferation resistance of a variety of nuclear fuel cycles. It can also provide insight 
into the effectiveness of integrated safeguards, and support the development of improved 
safeguards to support new NES designs.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Framework for the PR&PP Evaluation Methodology 
6. Usefulness of proliferation resistance studies 
The results of proliferation resistance studies can be used by decision-makers at all levels: 
 Government officials, including Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
legislative officials responsible for program approvals and funding appropriations  
 National licensing and regulatory authorities; export control authorities for State 
exports, imports and indigenous development  
 IAEA safeguards authorities and other safeguards inspectorates  
 Industrial designers/producers/vendors  
 Utility owners and operators (Pomeroy, et al., 2008)  
Decisions made by these authorities (Table 3) will set priorities for the activities of the 
nuclear energy system designers and can help determine the types of technologies and 
designs to pursue when investing in or building new civil nuclear facilities. Information 
provided by proliferation resistance assessments, properly used, can: 1) identify potential 
safeguards issues early in the design process; 2) provide a framework for the selection of 
design approaches that could  make safeguards at the facility more efficient and effective; 3) 
identify design innovations that could either raise new safeguards issues or lessen cost 
impacts on the IAEA or the facility operator; and 4) enable the designer to focus on whether 
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to address new safeguards issues with design modifications that eliminate the issue or with 
enhanced safeguards measures (Wonder & Hockert, 2011).  
 
Potential Users of a Proliferation 
Resistance Assessment and Evaluation 
Methodology 
Illustrative Uses of Proliferation Resistance 
Information 
 
Government officials, including Energy 
Ministry officials, Foreign Ministry 
Officials and Legislative officials 
responsible for program approvals and 
funding appropriations  
1. Ensuring provision of sustainable 
energy supply from safe, secure, 
economic and proliferation resistant 
sources.  
2. Basing nuclear export control decisions 
on well-understood and assessed 
proliferation threats  
National licensing and regulatory 
authorities, and export control 
authorities, for State exports, State 
imports and indigenous development  
1. Developing guidance on and validation 
of effective and efficient implementation 
of proliferation resistance/safeguards 
requirements in design and operation  
2. Providing basis for cooperation with 
regional and international safeguards 
authorities  
IAEA safeguards authorities and other 
safeguards inspectorates  
1. Providing understanding of the role of 
safeguards measures in proliferation 
resistance  
2. Ensuring that facility design and 
operation facilitate the implementation 
of safeguards  
Industrial designers/producers/vendors 1. Employing usable guidance for effective 
and efficient implementation of 
proliferation resistance/safeguards 
requirements in design and operation  
2. Ensuring that there are transparent 
acceptance procedures with assessable 
cost impacts  
Utility owners and operators  1. Enhancing public acceptance of nuclear 
energy production  
2. Providing transparent means for 
demonstrating that perceived threats are 
adequately controlled  
3. Optimizing extrinsic and intrinsic 
proliferation resistance measures with 
facility safety, operations, and cost  
Table 3. Users and Uses of Proliferation Resistance Information (Pomeroy, et al., 2008)  
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The following section describes how the results of proliferation resistance studies can be 
used, including discussions concerning nuclear material evaluation, facility safeguardability, 
and the implementation of safeguards by design. 
6.1 Nuclear material evaluations 
As more work in this area is performed, a number of lessons have been learned and some 
potential misconceptions have been identified. Experts generally agree that the 
attractiveness of the nuclear material and nuclear technology in an innovative nuclear 
system for use in a nuclear weapons program should be low. An important issue under 
current investigation is the concept of a “proliferation proof” material. Some have proposed 
that a material could be identified or developed that would be difficult—if not impossible—
to use as a weapon or nuclear explosive device because of the material’s isotopic content, its 
intrinsic radiation field, heat load, or other features. Such material would have minimal 
safeguards requirements.  
A team of specialists from the United States focused on material attractiveness issues from 
the standpoint of potential usability in a nuclear explosive device. Their studies reviewed a 
variety of materials associated with existing and proposed reprocessing schemes and 
nuclear fuel cycles. The research concluded that there are no “silver bullets” in conventional 
or advanced fuel cycle reprocessing schemes (e.g.; PUREX, UREX, COEX, and pyro-
processing). All products from such schemes are potentially attractive for use in a nuclear 
weapon or nuclear explosive device (Bathke, et al., 2009). 
The results of these studies support the assertion that relying on intrinsic features in a 
nuclear fuel cycle will not be sufficient to ensure that proliferation resistance goals will be 
met. Effective safeguards are of primary importance to the proliferation resistance of a 
nuclear energy system, and care must be taken not to construe proliferation resistance as 
being largely a function of intrinsic measures or as an absolute characteristic in the sense of 
a nuclear energy system being proliferation proof. Consequently, extrinsic features such as 
international safeguards and other institutional measures such as controls on the export of 
sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies remain essential and cannot be lessened. 
Rather, it is important to make these measures more effective and cost efficient by 
improving the “safeguardability” of an NES.  
6.2 Safeguardability 
The fundamental objective of international safeguards is to detect in a timely manner: 1) the 
diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful to non-peaceful uses, 
and/or 2) possible misuse of nuclear facilities for undeclared purposes. How well and how 
efficiently an NES meets this objective is defined as its safeguardability. Safeguardability can 
be understood as the extent to which the facility design readily accommodates and 
facilitates effective and cost-efficient safeguards, that is, effectively integrating a nuclear 
facility design’s technical features with required safeguards measures.  
An important use of the results of proliferation resistance studies is to evaluate and if 
necessary improve the safeguardability (Bjornard et al., 2009) of an NES by: 1) identifying, 
evaluating, and optimizing intrinsic barriers in the system design; 2) reviewing and 
evaluating safeguards measures for cost and effectiveness; and 3) ensuring that safeguards 
goals can be met. Figure 3 outlines this process. 
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Fig. 3. Elements of safeguardability 
Updating and strengthening a structured approach for accomplishing “Safeguards-by-
Design” (IAEA, 2009) to help improve the safeguardability of NES facilities is receiving 
substantial international attention, elements of this activity are discussed further below. 
6.3 Safeguards-by-Design 
The IAEA has described the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept as an approach in which 
“international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear 
facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and 
decommissioning” (IAEA, 2009). SBD has taken on a new importance in light of the 
expected “Nuclear Renaissance” and the requisite expansion of the global reactor fleet with 
an increased number and variety of reactors and fuel cycles under safeguards. As these new 
nuclear energy systems are being planned and constructed, it is clear that the IAEA must 
find ways to optimize its verification activities amidst continuing constraints on the financial 
and human resources available to it for safeguards. Consequently, the nuclear industry is 
beginning to address the problem of how it can facilitate the application of IAEA safeguards 
in a manner that provides benefits to both the IAEA and the facility operator. SBD is 
intended to help solve this issue by developing a structured approach for designing and 
incorporating safeguards features into new civil nuclear facilities at the earliest stages in the 
design process, and designing the facility in such a way that it more readily lends itself to 
being safeguarded. 
Broadly speaking, this effort would involve using safeguardability assessment tools:  1) to 
aid designers in identifying potential safeguards issues early in the design process; 2) to 
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provide them with a framework for the selection of facility-specific SBD best practices and 
lessons learned; and 3) to help them anticipate where innovations in their designs might 
pose new safeguards issues that might be addressed through changes in the design, or 
enhancements of accepted safeguards approaches in a manner likely to meet IAEA 
safeguards requirements while mitigating cost impacts on both IAEA and the facility 
operator (Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This approach, as laid out in Figure 4, parallels the 
PR&PP assessment methodology.  
Stakeholders responsible for developing and incorporating SBD in the design and 
construction of new nuclear facilities include those responsible for the design, approval, 
construction, oversight, operation, and safeguarding of a nuclear facility. These stakeholders 
include: 
 The IAEA 
 Owners/operators 
 Designers/builders 
 Regional or State Systems of Accounting and Control (R/SSAC), and 
 Equipment providers. 
The future application and development of the concept of SBD is ongoing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Safeguards by Design Process (Wonder & Hockert, 2011) 
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7. Conclusion 
New approaches for studying proliferation resistance continue to be developed and 
improved. Their goal is to help ensure that innovative nuclear energy systems are 
“unattractive and [the] least desirable routes for diversion or development of weapons-usable 
material.”  The “Safeguards-By-Design” approach has become the subject of intense research 
because it makes use of safeguardability assessment tools such as proliferation resistance 
studies to improve the design and construction of new facilities in such a way that they will 
be easier and more cost efficient to safeguard. Stakeholders and decision makers in the 
nuclear energy field will need to understand, apply, and advance the concepts discussed 
here to effectively participate in the development of proliferation resistant nuclear facilities 
in the future.  
Inquiry into the nature of proliferation resistance, the utility of different methodologies to 
study it, and the extent to which proliferation resistance studies offer useful and meaningful 
answers and insights for decision-makers continues. A growing body of literature is 
emerging on these subjects, and will continue to grow over the next several years. A new 
independent evaluation of proliferation resistance and proliferation resistance 
methodologies by the United States National Academy of Sciences will begin in the summer 
of 2011. The result will be a report to the U.S. Department of Energy in 2013 that should be 
particularly valuable in identifying the strengths and limitations of the concept of 
proliferation resistance and associated methodologies. Recommendations for whether and 
what types of additional methodology development activities should follow will be an 
important result of this work.  
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